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THE ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF NETWORK
TELEVISION PROGRAMMING
On December 10, 1974, the United States Department of Justice
filed antitrust suits in federal district court against the three national
television networks." The government's complaints seek injunctive re-
lief for alleged violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,2 which
prohibit combinations in restraint of trade, monopolization, and at-
tempts to monopolize.3 The target of the government's attack is the
well-entrenched practice whereby the networks produce their own televi-
sion programming for network transmission or acquire valuable finan-
cial and proprietary rights in programming produced by others.4 In
essence, the government claims that the networks have used their control
of the airwaves to monopolize prime time5 television entertainment
programming. 6
This litigation is certain to engender substantial controversy over
the next few years, both within and outside the entertainment industry,
and its outcome necessarily will have far-reaching implications for the
future of the broadcast industry. It is the purpose of this note to
examine the challenged network practice against the framework of the
antitrust laws, to explore the applicability of the antitrust laws to televi-
1. See United States v. CBS, Inc., Civil No. 74-3599 (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 10,
1974); United States v. ABC, Civil No. 74-3600 (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 10, 1974);
United States v. NBC, Civil No. 74-3601 (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 10, 1974). For pur-
poses of analysis, this note will focus on the government's suit against CBS. It is in
substance the same as the suits filed against ABC and NBC.
A private antitrust suit against CBS and ABC was filed on September 28, 1970,
alleging violations of sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act. See Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc. v. ABC, 501 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1974). The plaintiffs in that suit are a
number of major independent film producers and distributors. See id. at 895 n.1.
2. See Complaint for Plaintiff, United States v. CBS, Inc., Civil No. 74-3599
(C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 10, 1974).
3. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970&Supp. IV, 1974).
4. See notes 19-31 & accompanying text infra.
5. Prime time is defined to include the evening television viewing hours between
7 p.m. and 11 p.m. See Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 473 (2d
Cir. 1971).
6. According to Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Kauper, who is in charge
of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, the suits do not reach news, public af-
fairs, documentary, or sports programs, nor do they affect any agreement between the
networks and their affiliates. See Variety, Dec. 11, 1974, at 42, col. 2.
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sion as a regulated industry, and to assess the possible outcome of the
suits on the merits.
The History of the Litigation
The government's antitrust actions against the three networks have
had a history cloaked in political innuendo. 7  The Justice Department
originally brought suit against the networks on April 14, 1972.' React-
ing with outrage, the industry attacked the lawsuits as an attempt to "set
the clock back twenty years" and reduce the networks to a mere conduit
between the advertiser and the audience. In particular, the networks
alleged that the government had improper motives in bringing the
suits, 10 supporting this claim by pointing to the grudge the Nixon
administration held against the news media."
Against this backdrop, the networks sought to obtain various
White House tapes and documents which they maintained would sub-
stantiate their claim that the lawsuits were politically motivated. "' On
November 11, 1974, after the government had refused to comply with
7. For an overview of the first round of litigation commenced against the net-
works in 1972 see Judge Kelleher's opinion in United States v. NBC, 65 F.R.D. 415,
417 (C.D. Cal. 1974), appeal dismissed, 421 U.S. 940 (1975).
8. See id. The government's original action was also brought against Viacom In-
ternational, Inc., a former subsidiary of CBS involved in program syndication and cable
television businesses of which CBS divested itself in 1971. See BROADCASTING, Apr. 17,
1972, at 21. A consent judgment was entered against Viacom in that suit; consequently,
it was not made a party in the present actions. See 65 F.R.D. at 417.
9. See BROADCASTING, Apr. 17, 1972, at 21.
10. See 65 F.R.D. at 417. The government has argued consistently that regard-
less of the motivation behind the suits, they have legal merit. See BROADCASTING, May
5, 1975, at 18.
11. See BROADCASTING, May 5, 1975, at 17; Variety, Dec. 11, 1974, at 1, col.
2. In support of their contention that the Nixon administration had been gearing up
to whitewash the news media, the networks pointed particularly to the alleged existence
of White House tapes documenting planned retribution against the Washington Post.
See id. The suggestion was also made that the suit against the networks was a calcu-
lated effort on the part of the government to draw attention from the controversy sur-
rounding the settlement of the ITT antitrust suit. See BROADCASTING, Apr. 17, 1972,
at 21.
12. On July 17, 1974, the court entered an order requiring the government to an-
swer certain interrogatories calling for the identification of documents and tapes located
within the executive office of the president which related to the proposed antitrust litiga-
tion against the networks. See 65 F.R.D. at 417-18. Despite continued assurances from
the Justice Department, the requested answers were not forthcoming. The government
did identify certain documents which had already been made a part of the public record.
See id. at 418. As to documents within the possession, custody, and control of the
White House, however, the Justice Department claimed that it was unable to make iden-
tifications owing to a continuing question over the ownership of the papers. See id. at
418-19; BROADCASTING, May 5, 1975, at 17-18.
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the court's order to produce the requested documents, the court granted
the defendants' motion to dismiss.13  The court's dismissal, however,
was without prejudice, 14 allowing the government to reinstitute the
actions under a new administration and thereby- purge the suits of any
improper motives underlying the original actions.' 5 The government
filed the present actions a month later.16 In the meantime, the networks
appealed the district court's dismissal without prejudice to the United
States Supreme Court,'7 but the Court dismissed the appeal' and
thereby cleared the way for the new actions.
13. On September 27, 1974, the three networks filed motions to dismiss the ac-
tions on the ground that the government had voluntarily and intentionally failed to com-
ply with the court's discovery orders or, alternatively, to take as established the fact al-
leged in the defendants' answers asserting improper motive and to dismiss on that
ground. See 65 F.R.D. at 418. Full oral arguments on the motions were heard, and
the dismissal followed. See id.
14. The court agreed with the defendants' contention that the government had vol-
untarily failed to comply with the court's discovery order inasmuch as the government
voluntarily entered into an agreement with Mr. Nixon on September 6, 1974, by which
it consented to surrender custody of the tapes and documents, and then used the agree-
ment to justify its failure to respond to the interrogatories. See id. at 420-21. The
court was thus faced with a dilemma. On one hand, the court found that the clear vio-
lation of its orders by the government warranted the imposition of some sanction. On
the other hand, the court found sufficient evidence that the suits had merit to indicate
that the defendants were not prejudiced by the government's failure to comply. The
court saw in a dismissal without prejudice the proper resolution of its dilemma. See
id. at 421.
15. Of particular force in persuading the court that the suits had sufficient merit
to warrant a dismissal without prejudice was an affidavit submitted by then Attorney
General William B. Saxbe in support of the government's position. See id. In his affi-
davit, Mr. Saxbe stated that he had undertaken a personal review of the complaint in
light of the defendants' allegations of improper motive and had concluded that the gov-
ernment's claims were well founded and that prosecution of the actions was essential
to the public interest. See id. at 419. An announcement in a similar vein was made
in late 1974 by Watergate Special Prosecutor Henry Ruth, who pointed to a Watergate
staff investigation which had not uncovered any evidence of criminal activity in connec-
tion with the filing of the suits to substantiate his conclusion that they were not polit-
ically motivated. See Variety, Dec. 11, 1974, at 1, col. 2.
16. See BROADCASTING, Oct. 6, 1975, at 11; id., May 5, 1975, at 17; Variety, Dec.
11, 1974, at 1, col. 2.
17. In their appeal to the Supreme Court, the networks contended that the dis-
missal should have been with prejudice because of the alleged improper motives under-
lying the suits and the Ford administration's refusal to provide the requested documents.
See BROiCASTING, May 5, 1975, at 17. One defendant had argued before the district
court that the government's bad motives had so infected the suits as to make them incap-
able of being purged; the court, however, had declined to decide this issue. See 65
F.R.D. at 421. Justice Douglas temporarily stayed proceedings in the lower court until
the Supreme Court acted on the appeal. See BROADCASrING, May 5, 1975, at 18.
18. See NBC v. United States, 421 U.S. 940 (1975); BROADCASTING, Oct. 6, 1975,
at 11; id., May 5, 1975, at 17-18. In a brief order, the Court said that it lacked jurisdic-
tion to hear the appeal; it gave no other reason for its action. See 421 U.S. at 940.
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The government's second round of lawsuits against the networks
is currently in the discovery stage, and it is anticipated that the suits will
not proceed to trial for another year or two. The claims the government
is asserting can best be examined after an investigation of the challenged
network practice.
The Challenged Network Practice:
Control of Prime Time Through Network Programming
As a general proposition, the television networks are in the busi-
ness of procuring television programming and disseminating it over the
nation's airwaves. The networks historically have engaged in three
methods of program procurement: 19 network production of program-
ming directly included in network schedules, sale of exhibition time to
advertisers who sponsor independently produced programs, and joint
venture productions between the networks and independent producers.2"
As early as 1955,21 the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) became concerned about the potentially anticompetitive implica-
tions of the networks' program procurement policies and practices as
they related to the other components of the broadcast industry.22
Critics had leveled three charges against the networks which to the FCC
raised serious questions as to whether the networks were operating
within a competitive structure that would best serve the public interest.23
First, the networks allegedly "made use of the economic leverage de-
rived from their control of scarce broadcast time and facilities of affili-
19. For a network-by-network analysis of program procurement policies and prac-
tices see FCC TELEVISION NETWORK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT, H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 66-74 (1963) [hereinafter cited as TELEVISION NETwoRx PROGRAM
PROCUREMENT].
20. Id. at 65; see id. at 180. The FCC report indicates that the networks increas-
ingly had employed the joint venture arrangement as a primary means of procuring net-
work programming. Under this arrangement, the network approved a program idea sub-
mitted by an independent producer and advanced the money necessary to produce a pi-
lot. According to the FCC report, the network almost invariably acquired the right to
sell the series to advertisers for its first network run as part of the bargain. Further-
more, the network often insisted on acquiring rights and sharing in profits from network
exhibition, syndication, merchandising, and foreign'sales. The consideration given by
the network for these rights was its assumption of the financial risk involved in produc-
ing a new program. See id. at 65.
21. See id. at 3-4.
22. The components of the broadcasting industry are generally recognized to in-
clude the advertiser and advertising agency, the television network, the commercial tele-
vision station, the independent program producer and syndicator, the station representa-
tive, and the common carrier providing interconnection. FCC NETWoRK BROADCASTING,
H.R. REP. No. 1297, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1958) [hereinafter cited as NETWORK
BROADCASTING].
23. See TELEVISION NETWORK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT, supra note 19, at 4.
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ate-licensees to acquire financial or proprietary interests in programs
exhibited on networks in favorable time periods."24  Second, the net-
works allegedly "acquired financial interests in programing (on the ba-
sis of little or no consideration) from independent producers as a condi-
tion precedent to acceptance of such programs for network exhibi-
tion."2 5 Third, the networks allegedly "were progressively assuming
undue control and dominance of the television program market"
through the use of devices such as tie-in arrangements.2
Concerned about the alleged anticompetitive activities of the net-
works, the FCC initiated an inquiry into network program procurement
policies and practices. 27  The report which resulted from this inquiry
concluded that
[while] national television networks serve the public interest and
perform essential functions both to television licensees and to the
public ... the policies and practices of the networks in program
procurement unduly restrict and restrain the competitive develop-




26. Id. Tying occurs when a seller uses leverage in one product market to gain
economic power in a second product market. Tie-in arrangements are illegal per se
under both section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act. See North-
ern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). The FCC's inquiry into network program procurement
practices failed to disclose the alleged ties. Nevertheless, it did disclose "a system of
network control of. .. evening program schedules through financing of independently
produced programs." TELEviSION NaswoRK PROGRAM PRocuREMENT, supra note 19, at
65.
27. See TELEVISION N-rwoax PRoGRAM PRocuREM EN, supra note 19. By coinci-
dence, the Justice Department in the mid-1950's instituted an investigation into the net-
works' alleged tie-in practices which was collateral to the FCC's program inquiry. The
Justice Department concluded its investigation in March 1958. It was the department's
position that the matter "should in the first instance at least" be considered by the FCC
as "the regulatory agency charged with broad public responsibilities in this field." See
id. at 244.
28. Id. at 11. Among the perceived evils which most concerned the FCC study
staff were the networks' syndication activities. See id. at 102. Program syndication re-
fers to the process whereby a distributor sells or licenses programs for non-network ex-
hibition on a market-by-market basis. See Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442
F.2d 470, 486 (2d Cir. 1971); TELEvIsION NnrwoRPROGRAM PROCUREMENT, supra
note 19, at 102. The inquiry disclosed that each network operated a subsidiary business
engaged in syndicating programs to the networks owned and operated stations, its affili-
ated stations, and the affiliates of other networks. Over the five broadcast seasons pre-
ceding the inquiry, the networks had increasingly acquired rights to domestic syndica-
tion and foreign sales as well as other subsidiary rights including first-run exhibition
rights and rights to share in program profits. The net effect of network syndication
was that independent syndicators had to compete for both products and sales in limited
markets. See id. The study staff saw this pattern as raising serious questions concern-
The report emphasized that there is a "public interest in a free program
market in network television" because without such a market, diverse
and balanced programming might not be available to meet the needs
and interests of the community.29 By acquiring financial and proprie-
tary interests in programming, the networks were in a position to air
only those programs in which they had an economic interest, thus
inhibiting entry by independent sources into the program market.3 0 The
report concluded that the public interest would best be served by
creating and fostering "a competitive economic climate in the network
television program market in which a larger and more diversified overall
source of network television programs could develop."' 1
The Government's Claims in
United States v. CBS, Inc.
The government's current suit against the Columbia Broadcasting
System (CBS) reflects many of the same concerns over network pro-
gram procurement that were bothering fihe FCC in the 1950's.32 The
networks annually spend huge sums on the procurement of television
programming. 33  It is the government's position that the networks' share
of the program market, coupled with certain exclusionary practices, 34
has enabled them to foreclose independent producers from entering the
market.
According to the government, of the approximately 700 television
stations in the United States which broadcast commercial television
programs, about 200 have network affiliation agreements with CBS
ing the existence of a broad and competitive base from which television licensees could
choose programming and thus was prompted to recommend the elimination of network
competition in the domestic syndication field. See id. at 103-04.
29. See TELEVISION NETwoRK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT, supra note 19, at 24. For
a discussion in another context of the need for diverse broadcast formats and the propri-
ety of FCC regulation to ensure such diversity see Note, Developing Standards for Di-
versification of Broadcasting Formats, 52 TEx. L. REV. 558 (1974).
30. See TELEVISION NETwoRK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT, supra note 19, at 103. In
addition to inhibiting market entry by independent producers, undue concentration of
programming control in one network serves to inhibit competition by other networks,
particularly regional networks. Foreclosure of regional networks is especially undesir-
able inasmuch as these networks, which enjoy a broader economic base than local inde-
pendent stations yet reach a more narrowly defined audience than the national networks,
are uniquely situated to provide service in the public interest.
31. Id. at 104.
32. See text accompanying notes 21-31 supra.
33. The government alleges that in 1973 CBS, NBC, and ABC spent an aggregate
amount of more than $1 billion for television programming, and that of that amount,
CBS spent more than $340 million. See Complaint for Plaintiff at 4, United States
v. CBS, Inc., Civil No. 74-3599 (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 10, 1974).
34. See text accompanying note 46 infra.
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and depend upon CBS for virtually all of their television entertainment
during prime evening hours. 35 The government alleges that the three
networks have established themselves as the primary market for this tele-
vision programming by generally offering to sell air time only to adver-
tisers willing to advertise in conjunction with programs already selected
and scheduled by the networks. 6 Of the prime time programs CBS
broadcasts, the government claims, the majority have been programs
produced by CBS or programs in which CBS has acquired various
rights, interests, and licenses. In 1957, such programs allegedly consti-
tuted about 49 percent of the entertainment programs broadcast by CBS
during prime time hours. By 1967, this figure had allegedly increased
to 68 percent of prime time entertainment programming.37
The government further alleges that CBS has acquired syndication
and other valuable subsidiary program rights with respect to a substan-
tial number of television entertainment programs independently
produced and broadcast over the CBS network.38  In addition, the gov-
ernment alleges that CBS, as well as the American Broadcasting
Company (ABC) and the National Broadcasting Company (NBC),39
has entered into the feature film production and distribution market40 in
response to the marked increase in the use of motion picture feature
films as prime time television entertainment in recent years. 4' Because
35. See Complaint for Plaintiff at 4.
36. See id. at 5.
37. Id. The 1967 figure is 730/ if feature films are excluded.
38. See id. at 5-6. The government correctly acknowledges that in 1970 CBS
spun off its syndication activities to Viacom International, Inc. See id. at 6. The term
"spin off" refers to the procedure by which a corporation divests itself of its stock in
another corporation. See BALLA~mNf'S LAw DICtiONARY 1204 (3d ed. 1969). The fact
that CBS has divested itself of its syndication activities may make the government's
charges moot on this point.
39. The government alleges that in 1967 ABC announced plans to produce and
distribute feature films for exhibition in motion picture theaters and over the ABC net-
work. Complaint for Plaintiff at 7. It has been reported that ABC has a library of
thirty-nine theatrical feature films which it has produced. See Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc. v. ABC, Inc., 501 F.2d 894, 895 n.4 (2d Cir. 1974). In 1966 NBC allegedly con-
tracted with the Music Corporation of America for the production of feature films for
exhibition over its network. See Complaint for Plaintiff at 7.
40. The government alleges that toward this end, CBS formed a new division
known as Cinema Center Films, allocated an estimated $60 million as its first year bud-
get for feature film production, contracted with the persons necessary to carry out its
production activities, acquired studios at a cost of $9.5 million, produced thirty-four fea-
ture films, and entered into a six year exclusive film distribution contract. Complaint
for Plaintiff at 6-7.
41. The government asserts that the three networks began broadcasting feature
films during prime time hours in the early 1960's. By the 1967-1968 season, the govern-
ment alleges, each network generally broadcast feature films two evenings a week. Id.
at 6.
they control the access to their affiliates, the networks are allegedly "in a
unique position to assure themselves of nationwide television network
revenues for feature films which they produce ... ."I' Finally, the
government asserts that the successful production of television entertain-
ment programs and feature films requires the contributions of talented
persons, and that only the three networks can assure such persons that
they will get the television and theatrical exposure they desire.4"
On the basis of these allegations, the government charges that with
respect to the television entertainment programs exhibited over the CBS
network during prime time hours, CBS has engaged in a combination
with its owned and operated television stations, its affiliates, and its film
distributor" in an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act, and likewise has monopolized and attempted to
monopolize in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.45 Specifically,
the government charges that CBS has used its control over access to the
broadcasting time of the CBS network during prime evening hours (1)
to exclude television entertainment programs in which CBS has no
ownership interest from broadcast on the CBS network during prime
time, (2) to compel outside program suppliers to grant CBS financial
interests in independently produced programs, (3) to refuse to offer
program time alone to advertisers and other outside program suppliers,
(4) to control the prices CBS pays for television exhibition rights to
feature films distributed by non-network motion picture distributors,
and (5) to obtain a competitive advantage over other producers and
distributors of television entertainment programs and feature films. 46
The government points to four anticompetitive effects that have
resulted from the activity engaged in by CBS.47 First, "[o]wnership
and control of television entertainment programs broadcast during
prime evening hours on the CBS Network has been concentrated in
.. . CBS."'48  Second, "[c]ompetition in the production, distribution
and sale of television entertainment programs, including feature films,
42. Id. at 7.
43. See id.
44. The government identifies National General Corporation, a producer and dis-
tributor of feature films and onetime owner and operator of the second largest chain
of motion picture theaters in the United States, as the film distributor with which CBS
entered into a six year distribution contract in 1967. Under the terms of this contract,
National General had the exclusive right to distribute in the United States all theatrical
motion picture films produced by CBS. See id. at 6-7.
45. See id. at 7-8.
46. Id. at 8-9. The government's claims mirror the claims the government leveled
against the networks in the original actions brought in 1972. See United States v. NBC,
65 F.R.D. 415, 417 (C.D. Cal. 1974), appeal dismissed, 421 U.S. 940 (1975).
47. See Complaint for Plaintiff at 9-10.
48. Id. at 9.
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has 'been unreasonably restrained."49  Third, "[c]ompetition in the sale
of television entertainment programs to the CBS Television Network by
outside program suppliers . . . has been unreasonably restrained."'50
Fourth, "[tlhe viewing public has been deprived of the benefits of free
and open competition in the broadcasting of television entertainment
programs. 51
On the basis of the foregoing charges, the government seeks to
prohibit CBS from obtaining any interest, except for first-run exhibition
rights, in television entertainment programs and feature films produced
by others, and from engaging in syndication activities. 52  In addition,
the government seeks to prohibit CBS from transmitting for exhibition
over the CBS network any television entertainment programs or feature
films produced by CBS or any other commercial television network, and
from allowing any programs it produces to be transmitted over any other
commercial television network.53 Finally, the government seeks to
prohibit CBS from using its control of access to the broadcasting time of
the CBS network, the CBS owned and operated television stations, or
the CBS affiliates, to foreclose competition or obtain an unfair competi-
tive advantage in other fields.5 4
The Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to
Television as a Regulated Industry
It is a well-established principle that wholly regulated industries are
immune from challenge under the antitrust laws.5 5 Congress has ex-
pressly exempted certain activities regulated by government agencies
from the antitrust laws by statute.5 6 Perhaps the most common exam
pie of such an exemption lies in the public utilities field.5 7 The classic
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 9-10.
52. Id. at 10.
53. Id. It is not clear whether the government's sweeping plea for prohibition of
network program exhibition over "any other commercial network" is intended to em-
brace regional networks as well as the national networks. The better view would seem
to be that the prohibition should not include regional networks inasmuch as they lack
the economic power the national networks enjoy and in fact could be strengthened both
by gaining access to network programming and by having an outlet for their own pro-
gramming. On the other hand, the prohibition might be validly applied to the regional
networks if, in the absence of such a prohibition, the national networks were able to
use them as a vehicle to maintain control over television programming.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944).
56. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 221(a), 222(c)(1) (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974).
57. See Barrow, Antitrust and the Regulated Industry: Promoting Competition in
Broadcasting, 1964 DuKE L.J. 282, 283 & n.2, 284 [hereinafter cited as Barrow]. Pro-
fessor Barrow argues that "[t]he public interest seems best served by limiting exemp-
1215
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test of immunity from the antitrust laws is whether Congress has
adopted a pervasive regulatory approach toward a particular activity.58
Under the Communications Act of 1934,59 Congress created the
FCC and conferred upon it wide-ranging powers to regulate radio and
television as well as related communications carriers such as telegraph
and telephone. Despite the conferral of broad power, however, Con-
gress did not intend a pervasive regulatory approach in the broadcasting
field. 60  By its express terms, section 31361 of the Communications Act
makes the antitrust laws applicable to broadcasting, and section 31462 of
the act provides for the preservation of competition in the broadcasting
industry. 63  Moreover, in United States v. RCA, 64 the Supreme Court
held that the antitrust laws are applicable to television and that action by
the FCC does not bar their enforcement. 65
The touchstone of the Communications Act is section 309(a),66
which provides that station licenses are to be granted only if they will
serve the "public interest, convenience, and necessity." '67 Within that
broad standard, the importance of competition in broadcasting has been
recognized as one of the basic themes underlying the act. 68  In FCC v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 9 the Supreme Court observed that the act
was adopted "under the spur of a widespread fear that in the absence of
governmental control the public interest might be subordinated to mon-
opolistic domination in the broadcasting field." 0 The act thus recogniz-
es broadcasting as an area of free competition7 ' and empowers the FCC
tions from the antitrust laws to those instances in which regulation is or should be so
pervasive that there is little, if any, room for meaningful competition .... ." Id. at 299.
58. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973).
59. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974).
60. Unlike entry in public utilities, entry in the broadcasting industry "is con-
trolled solely because of the limited radio spectrum and rates are not regulated ....
Barrow, supra note 57, at 284. Because broadcasting is an area of free competition, Pro-
fessor Barrow views an antitrust exemption for broadcasting as an "especially unwise"
proposition. See id. at 300.
61. 47 U.S.C. § 313 (1970).
62. Id. § 314.
63. See also id. § 313(b) (1970) (authorizing the FCC to withhold licenses from
persons convicted of violating the antitrust laws).
64. 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
65. Id. at 346.
66. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1970).
67. Id. The Supreme Court has defined the public interest as the "interest of the
listening public in 'the larger and more effective use of radio.'" NBC v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
68. See NETWORK BROADCASTING, supra note 22, at 54. The study staff pinpointed
the licensing function of the FCC as the other basic concern of the act. See id.
69. 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
70. Id. at 137.
71. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1940).
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to consider antitrust policy in carrying out its regulatory functions.
72
Throughout its history, the FCC has sought to foster competition
in broadcasting 3 in furtherance of the statutory goal announced in
section 314 of the Communications Act. In 1941, for example, the
FCC adopted its chain broadcasting rules.74  Aimed at checking a
number of abusive practices by which the networks had attempted to
restrict competition in the broadcast industry, the rules altered industry
practices in several significant respects. First, the rules prohibited the
provisions in affiliation contracts by which the networks sought to
prevent their affiliates from broadcasting programs of other networks
and agreed in turn not to sell programs to other stations in the affiliate's
local area. Second, they shortened the term of affiliation contracts from
five to two years and curtailed the operation of option time clauses in
these contracts. 5 Third, they prohibited the networks from arbitrarily
limiting their affiliates' right to reject network programming. Finally,
they prohibited extensive network ownership of stations, 7  dual network
operation, and network control of station rates. In the landmark case of
NBC v. United States,7 7 the Supreme Court upheld the rules against the
claim that they were arbitrary and capricious and that they violated first
amendment rights.
NBC establishes that there is a close relationship between the
regulatory function of the FCC and the enforcement of the antitrust
72. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 223-24 (1943). One of the issues
presented in NBC was whether the FCC's promulgation of the chain broadcasting rules
was an ultra vires attempt to invade the Justice Department's jurisdiction over enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws. The Court held that the FCC could properly regulate within
the spirit of the antitrust laws as guardian of the public interest. See id. Under this
view the FCC can in effect go beyond the boundaries of the antitrust laws. In Mans-
field Journal Co. the court said, "Monopoly in the mass communication of news and
advertising is contrary to the public interest, even if not in terms proscribed by the anti-
trust laws." Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
73. See Barrow, supra note 57, at 285-86.
74. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (1975).
75. The practice known as "option time" was reflected in contractual provisions
in network-station affiliation agreements by which the networks were able to require sta-
tions to broadcast network programs during certain portions of the day. The FCC
eventually abolished network option time rights. See Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v.
FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 474 n.6 (2d Cir. 1971). For a comprehensive examination of the
option time practice see NETWORK BROADCASTING, supra note 22, at 279-400.
76. Prior to the adoption of the chain broadcasting rules, NBC had licenses to op-
erate ten stations, and CBS has licenses to operate eight stations. These eighteen sta-
tions were among the most powerful and desirable stations in the country. See NBC v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 206 (1943). Today, under the multiple ownership rules,
the FCC has attempted to forestall undue concentrations of control by limiting owner-
ship in the television spectrum to five VHF and two UHF stations. See NETwoRK
BROADCASTING, supra note 22, at 82.
77. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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laws by the Justice Department. 78  The result is that there are two
agencies of government charged with promoting competition in the
broadcast industry, 79 and that there must be an accommodation between
television as a regulated industry on one hand and the antitrust laws on
the other. The overriding consideration in making this adjustment, as
one writer points out, is to ensure that the public interest is the ultimate
beneficiary. 80
The Government's Burden of Proof Under
the Antitrust Laws
In United States v. CBS, Inc.,81 the government has charged CBS
with unreasonably restraining trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act,
and with monopolizing and attempting to monopolize under section 2 of
the Sherman Act.82 Following is an examination of what the govern-
ment must prove under established antitrust doctrine in order to prevail
in this action on the merits.
Combinations in Restraint of Trade Under
Sherman Act Section One
Section 1 of the Sherman Act 83 makes illegal every contract, com-
bination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Since 1911, the Supreme
Court has taken a rule of reason approach to section 1 violations, with
the result that only unreasonable restraints of trade are condemned. 84
Essential to a section 1 violation is a finding of agreement. 85  Although
this requirement is statutorily imposed, the Court has gradually moved
away from requiring a formal agreement 86 toward a willingness to infer
78. See note 72 supra. See also NETWORK BROADCASTING, supra note 22, at 97.
79. As Professor Barrow points out, it is difficult for business enterprises such as
the networks to exercise business judgment when any given transaction is subjected to
the scrutiny of two separate agencies of government. See Barrow, supra note 57, at 282.
Nevertheless, he suggests that broadcasting is open to both broad application of the anti-
trust laws and regulation by the FCC. See id. at 284.
80. See id. at 282.
81. Civil No. 74-3599 (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 10, 1974).
82. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974).
84. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911). Under the rule
of reason, certain restraints are deemed so unreasonable as to be illegal per se; other
restraints must be measured against their purpose, power, and effect. By 1958, the
Court had recognized four practices as illegal per se: price fixing, market division,
group boycotts, and tie-in arrangements. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
85. See P. AREEDA, ANTIrrUsT ANALYSIs 553 n.57 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as AREEDA].
86. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
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an agreement on the basis of active assurances 7 or even unwilling
compliance 8  on the part of the buyer, or communicated threats8 9 on the
part of the seller.90
One of the practices condemned by section 1 of the Sherman Act is
the so-called tie-in arrangement. 1 A tie-in may be defined as an
arrangement whereby the seller agrees to sell one product only on
condition that the buyer agree to buy a second product.92  In such a
case, the seller attempts to tie a valuable product in which he has market
power to a less valuable product. By forcing the buyer to take both
products, the seller is able to increase his share of the secondary mar-
ket.93
The entertainment industry, particularly the motion picture busi-
ness, has been a frequent perpetrator of unlawful ties94 as well as other
unreasonable restraints of trade.9 5 On the face of the complaint in
United States v. CBS, Inc.,9 6 it appears that the government is charging
CBS with unlawfully tying its network service to television programming
which it produces itself or in which it acquires a financial interest. If
the government has in fact taken this position, it will merely have to
show that CBS has sufficient power to impose a burden on an apprecia-
ble number of buyers in the market for network service and has a more
87. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
88. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
89. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
90. These tests of agreement apply specifically to vertical restraints. Vertical re-
straints are restraints affecting the supplier-customer relationship, in contrast to horizon-
tal restraints, which exist among competitors. See AREDA, supra note 85, at 498. The
Court has similarly softened the agreement requirement in the case of horizontal re-
straints. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). But
see Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
Vertical restraints are emphasized in this note inasmuch as this type of restraint appears
to be at issue in the principal case.
91. See AREEDA, supra note 85, at 568. The statute dealing expressly with tie-
in arrangements is section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). The reach
of the Clayton Act is somewhat limited, however, and the courts have viewed tie-in ar-
rangements as unreasonable restraints of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act as
well.
92. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
93. See AREEDA, supra note 85, at 568.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (block sales of
feature films to television stations); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S.
131 (1948) (block sales of feature films to movie theaters).
95. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) (dis-
tributors agreed to impose price floors on theater admissions and to prohibit double bill-
ings of top rated films); United States v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930)
(distributors agreed to deal only with exhibitors who complied with common credit
terms); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930) (distribu-
tors agreed to deal only with exhibitors who submitted to binding arbitration).
96. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
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than de minimis share of the market in television programming. 97  If
the government meets this burden, the challenged practice will be held
illegal per se,98 and no justification will be permitted. If the govern-
ment does not establish a per se illegal tie, the challenged practice may
still be invalidated upon examination of its purpose, power, and
effect.99
Monopolization Under Sherman Act Section Two
Section 2 of the Sherman Act' 0 makes it illegal to monopolize,
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire to monopolize. Under
section 2 the courts have developed two tests to determine whether a
defendant with a substantial market share is guilty of monopolization.
One test finds the defendant guilty unless his monopoly power has been
thrust upon him by market conditions or it has been achieved by virtue
of his skill, industry, and foresight.' 0 ' The other test finds him guilty if
he has achieved his monopoly power through the practice of exclusion-
ary acts which limit the opportunities of competitors to compete and are
not indispensable to normal business operations and socially desirable
competition on the merits.' 0 2
The critical question in a monopolization charge is whether the
defendant who engages in predatory behavior has monopoly power.0 3
Monopoly power is classically measured by the percentage share of the
relevant market' controlled by the defendant. 0 5 The courts have
indicated that a 75 percent market share is sufficient to establish mo-
97. This is the classic test of an unlawful tie under the Sherman Act. See Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501, 504 (1969).
98. See id. at 498.
99. See id. at 500.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974).
101. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir.
1945).
102. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948). The defendant in
Griffith maintained movie theaters in towns both in which he was the sole exhibitor
and in which he faced competition from other exhibitors. As a condition to exhibiting
films in the closed towns, he demanded first run films for all his theaters. The Court
held that his attempt to use his leverage in the closed towns to secure a preferred posi-
tion in the open towns constituted an exclusionary act in violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. For examples of other unlawful exclusionary acts under section 2 see Ot-
ter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (refusals to deal); United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aft'd per curiam,
347 U.S. 521 (1954) (patent gobbling and long term leases).
103. See AREEDA, supra note 85, at 195.
104. The relevant market is defined to include those suppliers whose existence af-
fects the defendant's power. It has two components: the product market and the geo-
graphic market. See id. at 197.
105. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424-25 (2d
Cir. 1945).
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nopoly power, 1°6 but that 64 percent is probably insufficient.10 7 While,
as the two tests above indicate, no court has held that monopoly power
alone will sustain a finding of monopolization, 10 8 it is an essential
condition of the charge.
In the principal case, the government has alleged that CBS in 1967
controlled 68 percent of the market in television entertainment program-
ming, or 73 percent if feature films are excluded in computing the
relevant market.10 9 Under the prevailing view," 0 this percentage share
may not be enough to constitute the requisite monopoly power for
monopolization, regardless of whatever exclusionary acts the govern-
ment may be able to establish.:"'
Even though a defendant does not have sufficient monopoly power
to be guilty of monopolization, he may still be guilty under section 2 of
the Sherman Act of an attempt to monopolize. Unlike monopoliza-
tion,"12 attempt to monopolize requires a showing of specific intent,"13
measured by a willingness on the defendant's part to step outside the
bounds of normal competitive behavior, and a dangerous probability of
success,"14 measured in terms of the relevant market." 5 Inasmuch as
the government has charged CBS with an attempt to monopolize" 6 as
well as with monopolization, it may prevail on the former charge even if
it fails as to the latter.
106. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 343 & n.1
(D. Mass. 1953).
107. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir.
1945).
108. The government came close in one case to testing the argument that "bigness
is bad per se." See United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19
(D. Conn. 1970). Settlement of the case under a consent decree, however, forced the
government to abandon this challenge, at least for the present time.
109. See Complaint for Plaintiff at 5, United States v. CBS, Inc., Civil No. 74-3599
(C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 10, 1974). See note 104 supra. In its report in the 1950's, the
network study staff suggested two measures of network control: first, the network's
share of program production; second, network occupancy of program time periods. See
NETWORK BROADCASTNG, supra note 22, at 185-93.
110. See text accompanying notes 106-07 supra.
111. Also available, however, are far more damaging figures which indicate that be-
tween 1957 and 1968, the share of network evening programs either produced or directly
controlled by the networks rose from 67.2% to 96.7%. See Mt. Mansfield Television,
Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 482 (2d Cir. 1971).
112. It is clear that no showing of specific intent is required for a finding of mo-
nopolization. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948); United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 346 (D. Mass. 1953).
113. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153 (1951).
114. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946).
115. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
177 (1965).
116. See Complaint for Plaintiff at 8. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
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Network Defenses
In its answer to the government's complaint, 1 7 CBS offers three
major defenses relevant to the instant inquiry:" 8 first, that the action is
barred by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; second, that the action
violates the first amendment; and third, that the action is moot in light
of duplicative FCC regulations." 9  These defenses will be examined
below.
The Primary Jurisdiction Defense
CBS argues that inasmuch as the Justice Department's action
concerns matters that Congress by statute has entrusted to the FCC, the
Justice Department is barred by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 2 °
If the doctrine applies to a particular regulated activity, the court can
entertain a challenge to the activity only after the matter has been
considered by the governing agency. 121 In effect, it is a corollary to the
rule mentioned above that a pervasive regulatory approach to a particu-
lar activity makes it immune from outside attack.'22
The question whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies
to the broadcasting industry was squarely presented in United States v.
RCA 12'3 The Court observed that although television is a regulated
industry, it is regulated differently than those industries to which a
pervasive regulatory scheme attaches, as the television industry remains
free to set its own rates. The Court held that the difference was
controlling and that the primary jurisdiction doctrine did not apply. 24
In the face of RCA, it does not appear that this defense can
withstand scrutiny. The court has already rejected the primary jurisdic-
tion defense at least once in this protracted litigation.'25 In that in-
117. See Answer for Defendant, United States v. CBS, Inc., Civil No. 74-3599
(C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 30, 1974).
118. CBS also offers by way of defense that the government's current suit against
it is a continuation of the government's original suit brought in 1972, and since the orig-
inal suit was barred because it was brought in the exercise of improper motives, the cur-
rent suit is likewise barred. See id. at 6-9. This defense appears to lack merit inas-
much as all the parties to the original suit apparently agreed that a dismissal without
prejudice foreclosed any future affirmative defense to a refiling based on improper mo-
tive. See -United States v. NBC, 65 F.R.D. 415, 421-22 (C.D. Cal. 1974), appeal dis-
missed, 421 U.S. 940 (1975).
119. See Answer for Defendant at 9-10.
120. See id.
121. See Barrow, supra note 57, at 294. For a thorough discussion of the history
and philosophy of the primary jurisdiction doctrine see United States v. RCA, 358 U.S.
334, 346-48 (1959).
122. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
123. 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
124. See id. at 348-50.
125. See United States v. NBC, 29 P & F RAnio REG. 2D 597 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
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stance the court reasoned that the rules promulgated by the FCC
regulate future conduct rather than determine the propriety of past
conduct. Finding that nothing that the FCC is empowered to adjudicate
would resolve the antitrust issues presented, the court determined that
postponing jurisdiction would serve no useful purpose. 126
The First Amendment Defense
CBS argues that restrictions by the government on its entertain-
ment program activities would unconstitutionally infringe upon its free-
dom of speech in two ways: first, by restraining its freedom to deter-
mine what to broadcast;127 and second, by restraining its freedom to
engage in the production of television programs, itself a form of
speech.' 28
The law is well settled that the protection of the first amendment
extends to the broadcasting industry. 29 Nevertheless, in the landmark
case of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,130 the Court recognized that
because access to the industry is limited by the width of the broadcast
spectrum, the constitutional standards that attach to the regulation of
the broadcast media must be different from the standards applicable to
other forms of communication.'' The standard which the Court artic-
ulated in Red Lion was one which recognizes the public's right of access
to information as the paramount right.13 2  Indeed, in another context,
the Court has recognized that the first amendment stems from the
premise that "the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public
"'33
Under guiding principles such as these, the courts have consistently
upheld regulation of the broadcasting industry against first amendment
challenges. 34 The government's attack on the alleged unreasonable
126. See id. at 605.
127. See Answer for Defendant at 9.
128. See id.
129. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
130. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
131. See id. at 386. When it is impossible for all who wish to be broadcasters to
do so, the Court said, "the First Amendment confers no right. . . to an unconditional
monopoly of a scarce resource which the Government has denied others the right to
use." Id. at 391.
132. See id. at 390.
133. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). In that case the
Court held that evenrin a constitutionally protected area, combinations which unduly re-
strict the freedom of the press by restraining "trade in news and views" are illegal. See
id.
134. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding
the fairness doctrine); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (upholding the chain
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restraint of trade and monopolization of prime time entertainment pro-
gramming in which CBS has engaged, both directly through its own
production of programs and indirectly by obtaining financial and pro-
prietary interests in programs produced by others, presents an issue
which differs in an important respect from the issue involved in Red
Lion. The difference, however, appears to weigh in favor of the
government and against CBS.
The question before the Court in Red Lion was the validity of
those aspects of the fairness doctrine which require broadcasters to offer
to individuals made the subject of personal attack and political editorial-
izing a reasonable opportunity to respond over the broadcaster's facili-
ties.' 3  The fundamental question thus presented in that case was the
right of the broadcaster to control the reporting of controversial issues in
the public arena. In contrast, the question presented in the instant
action is the broadcaster's right, or lack thereof, to control the source of
entertainment programming.
The Court in Red Lion upheld the fairness doctrine against a first
amendment attack. 3 6 If the Court was able to perceive no constitution-
al infirmity in the FCC's attempt to regulate the reporting of controver-
sial issues, the discussion of which is fundamental to a democratic
society, it is doubtful that it would hold unconstitutional the regulation
of entertainment programming. The Court's language in Red Lion is
broad in its observation that "[t]he right of free speech of a broadcaster
• . .or any other individual does not embrace a right to snuff out the
free speech of others. 1" 7
In addition, to the extent that entertainment programming may be
considered more of a commercial enterprise than news programming,
the claim made by CBS that its program production activities constitute
a protected form of speech will be accorded even less judicial weight. 38
broadcasting rules); Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir.
1971) (upholding the prime time access, syndication, and financial interest rules).
135. Broadly stated, the fairness doctrine requires radio and television broadcasters
to present discussion of public issues over the broadcast stations and to give fair cover-
age to each side of such issues. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
369 (1969). The two aspects of the fairness doctrine at issue in Red Lion were codified
in the form of FCC regulations in 1967. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598,
73.679 (1975). The fairness doctrine is to be distinguished from the equal time doc-
trine, set forth in section 315 of the Communications Act, which requires equal time
to be allotted to all qualified candidates for public office. See Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369-70 (1969).
136. See 395 U.S. at 375.
137. Id. at 387.
138. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942); DeVore & Nelson, Commercial Speech and Paid Access to the Press, 26 HAsT-
INGS L.J. 745, 747-64 (1975). But cf. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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Of course, if entertainment programming is cast as commercial speech,
CBS can argue that the government has a lesser interest in controlling it,
by analogy to the FCC's recent retreat from involvement in straight
product advertising. 39 The argument is easily rebutted: to the extent
that such programming deals with or should deal with relationships
between people and institutions, thereby contributing to viewers' knowl-
edge and understanding, it is subject to an equal degree of control in the
public interest.
What the government seeks in its action against CBS is the diversi-
fication of entertainment programming transmitted over this commercial
television network. In the event the government prevails, the effect will
be to force CBS to broadcast programs produced by independent
sources. Insofar as this shift in control will foster a competitive pro-
gram marketplace, it will serve the public interest by exposing viewers to
new and vatried ideas and talent. CBS may well be concerned that if it
is precluded from entertainment program production, it will lose a
valuable revenue base. Pitted against the more important governmental
goal of service in the public interest, however, it appears that this
financial concern will be unsufficient to sustain the network's position.
With these considerations in mind, it is apparent that Red Lion,
while factually distinguishable, supplies a fundamental principle appli-
cable to the instant action. The control of programming maintained by
CBS limits the alternative sources of programming broadcast over a
major television network and, as a natural consequence, infringes upon
the viewing public's right of access to information. In the face of Red
Lion, it appears that the first amendment defense tendered by CBS will
not withstand scrutiny.
FCC Regulatory Action as a Bar
CBS argues that the government's action seeks a decree which is
duplicative of the regulations and policies of the FCC, that the network
is no longer engaged in the activities which the government attacks and
the regulations preclude, and that therefore the action is moot.140
This defense appears to present a strong front for CBS. In 1970
the FCC adopted new rules relating to prime time access, network
syndication activities, and the financial interests the networks acquired
in television programming.' 4 The three rules were adopted after ex-
139. See FCC Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, 39 Fed. Reg. 26372,
26382 (1974); Barrow, The Fairness Doctrine: A Double Standard for Electronic and
Print Media, 26 HAsTiNGs LJ. 659, 678 (1975).
140. See Answer for Defendant at 10.
141. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.658(j)-(k) (1975).
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tensive investigation'42 had disclosed many of the abuses which the
government is apparently attacking in its antitrust suits. 4 ' Under the
prime time access rule, 144 the networks are prohibited from offering to
television stations more than three hours of network programming
between the hours of 7 p.m. and 11 p.m. The syndication rule'45
prohibits the networks from engaging in the distribution of programs for
non-network exhibition. The financial interest rule 46 further pro-
hibits the networks from obtaining any financial or proprietary rights
in the exhibition, distribution, or other commercial use of any television
program produced by someone other than the network itself, except
the right to network exhibition on affiliated stations.'47
In the case of the networks' alleged syndication activities and
financial involvement in independent programming, the Justice Depart-
142. For a review of the FCC's investigation see Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v.
FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 473-74 (2d Cir. 1971). The announced purpose of the FCC pro-
ceedings was "to determine the policies and practices pursued by the networks and others
in the acquisition, ownership, production, distribution, selection, sale and licensing of
programs for televised exhibition, and the reasons and necessity in the public interest
for said policies and practices .... ." Id.
143. The FCC's study had concluded that "the three networks not only in large
measure determine what the American people may see and hear during the hours when
most Americans view television but also would appear to have unnecessarily and unduly
foreclosed access to other sources of programs. . . ." Id. at 474. On the basis of that
conclusion, the FCC had proposed the new rules, which were designed "to foster free
competition in television program markets" by providing "opportunity for entry of more
competitive elements into the market for television programs for network exhibition"
and encouraging "the growth of alternate sources of television programs for both net-
work and non-network exhibition." Id.
144. Leading to the enactment of the prime time access rule was the finding of an
"unhealthy situation" in which "[o]nly three organizations control access to the crucial
prime time evening television schedule." Id. at 475. The FCC had concluded that the
existing network practices had centralized control and virtually eliminated needed
sources of competitive programming contrary to the public interest. See id. at 475-76.
145. The FCC adopted the syndication and financial interest rules in conjunction
with the prime time access rule to prevent indirect circumvention of the latter rule and
to encourage "development of diverse and antagonistic sources" of television program-
ming. See id. at 476.
146. The FCC had found a direct relationship between new programs selected for
network scheduling and network acquisition of subsidiary rights: "[S]ave for about six
or seven percent of their schedules which were the result of direct dealing between inde-
pendent producers and sponsors, [the] networks accepted virtually no entertainment pro-
gram for network exhibition in a five-year period in which they did not have financial
interests in syndication and other subsequent use ....... Id. at 485.
147. The court in upholding the rules found them to lie within the statutory power
granted to the FCC as long as they were "reasonably ancillary to the effective perform-
ance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broad-
casting." Id. at 487, quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157,
178 (1968).
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ment is seeking to prevent what the FCC has already prohibited. 48
The major difference between the Justice Department and FCC posi-
tions lies in the attitudes of the two bodies toward the airing of network
programming. The Justice Department would prohibit the networks
from engaging in the broadcast of any network-produced programming
whatsoever.' 49  The FCC, in contrast, has simply limited the networks
to offering not more than three hours of network programming in the
prime time viewing hours.
As to the first two activities, perhaps the Justice Department's
position is that the FCC's rules have not been effective to control the
abuses in which the networks have historically engaged. As to the third
activity, perhaps the Justice Department feels that the three hour limita-
tion imposed by the FCC is ijiadequate to correct the anticompetitive
effects of network program production. As a practical matter, the
FCC's three hour limitation is tantamount to no limitation; in the
context of a four hour prime time viewing period, a high concentration
of control remains lodged in the networks. The Justice Department can
thus argue that the networks' control of programming violates antitrust
principles regardless of the FCC's prime time access rule.150
It is clear that action by the FCC does not bar enforcement of the
antitrust laws by the Justice Department.' 5 Nevertheless, it seems that
CBS has a strong argument that deference should be paid to the FCC's
approach to regulating prime time programming. This approach repre-
sents years of extensive study and a balancing of conflicting interests
and needs, and it recognizes that, in the final analysis, the broadcast
industry as it is presently constituted is a commercial enterprise.' 52
148. See text accompanying notes 145-47 supra. Indeed, it has been suggested that
the government's reliance on "antiquated information which treats television as though
it hasn't changed since 1967" indicates that the government was acting in questionable
haste. See Variety, Apr. 19, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
149. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
150. For a chronicle of other examples of conflict between the Justice Department
and the FCC in their application of the antitrust and regulatory approaches to broad-
casting see Barrow, supra note 57, at 289-94.
151. See United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 346 (1959). See text accompanying
notes 64-65 supra.
152. Viewing the broadcast industry as a competitive enterprise brings another de-
fense tendered by CBS into focus. CBS argues that insofar as its activities in the produc-
tion and financing of television programming constitute an "economically appropriate re-
sponse" to anticompetitive conditions in the industry, they cannot constitute an unrea-
sonable restraint of trade. See Answer for Defendant at 10-11. If the government es-
tablishes that the challenged network activities constitute an illegal tie, this defense can-
not prevail under established antitrust doctrine. See text accompanying notes 97-98
supra. On the other hand, if the government fails to establish a tie, this defense will
be cognizable when the challenged activities are examined against their purpose, power,
and effect. See text accompanying note 99 supra. ABC has made a substantially simi-
lar argument in a similar but unrelated antitrust suit brought against ABC and CBS.
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Moreover, one may question the justice of a decree which would
have the effect of totally precluding CBS from engaging in entertain-
ment program production, a natural concomitant to the network's pri-
mary function of program transmission. To the extent that the relief
which the Justice Department seeks takes on the character of a penalty,
one can argue that the Justice Department is asking for too much.
Should the court agree with the Justice Department's position in princi-
ple, a better resolution might be to modify the existing FCC rule so as to
further limit network participation in program production, rather than
to prohibit it altogether.
Conclusion
The government's antitrust suits against the networks present seri-
ous questions concerning the current viability of the broadcasting indus-
try. The networks may argue, and perhaps correctly, that whatever
power they have is necessary for their economic survival. Yet when the
networks' degree of control enables them to squeeze out alternative
sources of television programming, it seems that this control constitutes
an excess of power within the framework of a competitive enterprise.
Indeed, the impact of such control is accentuated in the context of a
medium to which access is subject to the natural limitations of the
broadcast spectrum.
Insofar as the government's suits may serve to achieve greater
program diversity, they can be viewed as fostering a healthy goal. The
decision in Red Lion makes it clear that there is no right to monopolize
the nation's airwaves. Because access to this medium is limited, the
networks' right to broadcast is not coextensive with the rights of speech
and press in other contexts. Rather, it is the duty of the networks to
serve in a fiduciary capacity to ensure that an uninhibited marketplace
of ideas and talent is preserved.
Viewed in this light, the real issue presented by this litigation
becomes not the networks' right to control television programming, or
the Justice Department's right to curtail such programming, but the
See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. ABC, 501 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1974). In that case,
ABC defended its alleged anticompetitive activities with regard to network production
of feature films on the ground that they constituted vertical integration by internal ex-
pansion, which is not per se illegal and which under certain circumstances can in fact
be procompetitive. See id. at 897. The circumstances to which ABC pointed as making
its film production activities procompetitive were an alleged shortage of films resulting
from prior utilization of independent films, and increasing television consumption of
films. In 1966, the number of films produced by major independents was 162, in con-
trast to 333 such films in 1956. See id. at n.11. In addition, the average price for the
license of a feature film had increased from $100,000 in 1961 to $800,000 in 1967. See
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right of the people to information and entertainment. If indeed the
purpose of the broadcast industry is service in the public interest, it is
this right which ultimately is at stake.
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